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Abstract—Content sharing platforms such as Youtube and
Vimeo have promoted pay per view models for artists to monetize
their content. Yet, artists remain at the mercy of centralized
platforms that control content listing and advertisement, with
little transparency and fairness in terms of number of views or
revenue. On the other hand, consumers are distanced from the
publishers and cannot authenticate originality of the content. In
this paper, we develop a reliable and fair platform for content
sharing without a central facilitator. The platform is built as a
decentralized data storage layer to store and share content in
a fault-tolerant manner, where the peers also participate in a
blockchain network. The blockchain is used to manage content
listings and as an auditable and fair marketplace transaction
processor that automatically pays out the content creators and
the storage facilitators using smart contracts. We demonstrate the
system with the blockchain layer built on Hyperledger Fabric and
the data layer built on Tahoe-LAFS, and show that our design
is practical and scalable with low overheads.
I. INTRODUCTION
Video and music on demand has emerged as a common
delivery medium and business model that has spurred the
media and entertainment market to grow consistently at double
digits to tens of billions of dollars today. Two business models
have been extremely popular and successful. First, a sub-
scription model adopted by Netflix, Hulu and several others,
collects a fixed periodic subscription fee from consumers
providing them unlimited viewing access to their repository of
content. This provides the central facilitator disproportionate
negotiating power and their contracts with content publishers
are often lopsided, with the publishers getting no visibility
into the viewership or popularity of their content and no share
of revenue if the content is hugely popular [1]. A second
business model based on advertisement revenue adopted by
platforms such as Youtube, makes the content typically free
or available at a small pay-per-view charge, while making
the bulk of their revenue through advertisements. Here again,
content publishers only get a fraction of the revenue, typically
only after they reach a certain level of popularity, with no
transparency in how they are compensated [2].
In this paper, we aim to shift the balance more in favour
of content publishers and provide a platform for independent
artists and talented content publishers to showcase their con-
tent and be compensated fairly. We argue that this requires
a third business model that is transactional in nature and
disintermediates the central facilitator. A transactional pay-
per-purchase model has worked well for music and books
such as in Apple’s iTunes and Amazon’s Kindle, but there
is little transparency and fairness to content publishers who
need to completely trust the central facilitator on the number
of copies sold. The key idea of this paper is to replace this
central facilitator with a decentralized system of peers that
collectively provide the same service of content listing and
delivery. While decentralized marketplaces for content delivery
have been proposed by startups [3], [4], we make significant
new contributions in the reliability and fairness guarantees
provided by our system.
Our content sharing marketplace comprises of a decentral-
ized data storage layer to store content in a fault-tolerant man-
ner, where the peers additionally participate in a blockchain
network. When a content publisher wishes to host their content
on the platform, they first encrypt it and then apply erasure
coding to break the content into smaller chunks. The chunks
are stored on different servers in their storage layer, such that
no single server has any content in its entirety. This ensures
privacy of the content from the peers as well as tolerance to
peer failures. A smart contract on the blockchain maintains
a listing of all content and the hashes of the chunks held by
different peers for each content. A consumer, when purchasing
a content, downloads chunks from different peers and verifies
that they match the hashes specified by the publisher. The
consumer can then decode the original content and erasure
coding ensures that the content is the original uploaded one.
Our protocol ensures that a consumer cannot download the
chunks from the peers and reconstruct the original content
without making a payment. Upon receiving payment from the
consumer, a smart contract on the blockchain ensures that the
publisher as well as all peers serving the content are automat-
ically paid in a fair and transparent manner. Further, we also
support the ability to censor illegal content in a decentralized
manner, preventing it from ever being downloaded.
We make the following key contributions in this paper:
• We develop a decentralized marketplace for content deliv-
ery that supports a transactional model for compensating
publishers, by leveraging an innovative combination of
blockchain, p2p data storage, and erasure coding.
• We guarantee (i) fairness for all parties involved despite
maliciousness or collusion among peers, (ii) privacy of the
content from peers involved in delivery, (iii) fault tolerance
and availability of the content despite peer failures, and (iv)
censorship of content that are illegal, inappropriate, or have
expired, all in a decentralized manner.
• We implement the marketplace with the blockchain layer
built using Hyperledger Fabric [5] and the decentralized
data storage layer built using TahoeFS [6]. We study the
performance of the system and demonstrate that the system
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scales well with reasonable overheads.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we provide an outline of some of the
related work, describe our system model and assumptions, and
formally define the problem we address in this paper.
A. Background and Related Work
Digital Content Marketplaces: Digital content like ebooks,
music and videos are all sold and purchased in marketplaces
that manage listing, discovery, secure storage, and purchase of
content. Unlike physical marketplaces, they are not constrained
by location and they also provide the service of delivery of
content to the buyer. More recently, with regulators clamping
down on them, censorship of content is also being supported.
However, the lack of physical connect between the seller and
buyer that physical marketplaces offered, has caused fairness
to be a concern. Content publishers do not have transparency
on the number of copies sold and also get only a fraction of the
proceeds from content sales [1], [7]. Regulators do not have
auditability or the ability to track and censor illegal content [2].
Peer-to-peer Content Sharing: Existing P2P content sharing
mechanisms such as BitTorrent [8] have evolved in a different
context and do not provide a platform for a marketplace.
Desired properties such as fairness, censorship and auditability
can never be met. Issues like free riding [9] and blocked
leecher problem [10] show that the system is not fair.
Blockchain: Though the initial design was in the context
of censorship resistant, peer-to-peer decentralized currency,
Bitcoin [11], the scope now has grown to a wide range of
applications including supply chain, finance and governance.
Smart contracts permit processes involving mutually distrust-
ing entities to be executed in a decentralized manner on the
blockchain, enabling the entities to work together on shared
data minimizing the need for centralized trusted entities. The
main idea has been to maintain a replica of an immutable
append-only hash-chained ledger of transactions at each peer,
with additions to the ledger managed through distributed
consensus amongst the blockchain peers.
Decentralized Storage: Centralized cloud storage providers
can be vulnerable to data thefts, leaks and downtime [12],
[13]. With increased connectivity and availability of cheap
storage, decentralized storage solutions such as IPFS [14] and
Tahoe-LAFS [6] have emerged. They provide privacy and high
availability as the system stores encrypted content on nodes
forming a decentralized storage network. But, these solutions
lack payment mechanisms to incentivize participants renting
out storage. Also, the participants trust each other. Solutions
like Storj [15], Sia [16], Filecoin [17] and others [18], [19]
use an incentive structure along with decentralized storage.
Further, they support storage accountability by asking each
node to produce proofs of storage, but do not support a
marketplace with fairness to sellers and buyers. In our work,
we leverage decentralized storage literature to design the
storage and content delivery layer between a seller and a buyer.
Decentralized Marketplaces: Early work like Farsite [20]
aside, recently some startups such as LBRY [4] and Open-
Bazaar [3] attempt to build decentralized marketplaces for
digital goods. These systems do not guarantee content delivery
after payment and do not address the issue of fairness. There
are provisions such as multisig transactions in Bitcoin, where
a trusted third party(TTP) can facilitate the payment but it is
often hard to find a mutually trusted mediator. Once hosted,
privacy of the content is also not ensured. Another major
issue in such systems is that they are explicitly built to be
censorship-resistant and not auditable, similar to Bitcoin. Most
P2P content systems host illegal content and it is often very
hard to censor because of the lack of auditability. Govern-
ments either block indexing and tracking websites or ask the
marketplace to pull down a content. But these techniques do
not ensure that the content is inaccessible because of either
mirror tracking websites, or only search results are blocked
at the application layer on the client side and is not enforced
in a decentralized manner. Clients can still easily find and
download the illegal content. Similar solutions are presented
in [21], [22], but they lack fairness and censorship properties
provided in our design.
B. System Model
We have the following entities and their respective roles in
the system:
• Publisher (P) offers content on the system for purchase,
but may not be able to host the content herself. She expects
her clients to be able to discover her content and purchase
them. To this end, she is willing to employ servers in the
system who can store and serve her content at some cost.
• Facilitator (S) facilitates the marketplace by listing, storing
and serving content. A collection of facilitators form the
decentralized marketplace and they are compensated for
their services. The system allows for independent server
providers competing on costs and quality of service.
• Client (C) wants to browse, purchase and download content.
• Auditor is an external regulator who may impose restric-
tions on sale of particular illegal content and mark such
content as not downloadable.
We assume a model where the publisher selects multiple
facilitators for storing its content based on quality of service
and cost. This avoids centralization and ensures fault tolerance.
Given the above parties, several questions arise with regards to
who pays the facilitators, the time of payment and the payment
scheme. While many variants are possible, we discuss two
broad variants:
1. Offline: The publisher and facilitators may have negotia-
tions or conduct auctions with or without using blockchain
for this process. The agreement could involve paying the
facilitators a flat fee periodically or could be based on the
number of downloads of the content. We call this ‘offline’ as
this process happens outside the process of a buyer purchasing
a content from the marketplace.
2. Online: When a buyer makes a payment to the marketplace,
a smart contract executing on blockchain automatically pays
the publisher as well as the facilitators involved in serving that
content, based on payment terms previously agreed upon. We
call this ‘online’ as the process of payment to the facilitators
happens immediately with the buyer making the purchase.
The solution we propose in Section III works with both
these model variants. In both cases, the publisher decides
the facilitators and then uploads to each of them. We do not
explicitly discuss this process as there are well known methods
leveraging auctions, negotiations and contracts. We do address
the challenge of paying the facilitators in the online model.
All content transfers happen point-to-point not involving the
marketplace. However, operations such as payments are nec-
essarily made via the decentralized marketplace.
We make the following assumptions in our model. We
assume that each piece of content hosted on the platform
is unique, identifiable by its hash. For simplicity, we do
not discuss the scenario where a content is jointly owned
by multiple publishers, although our design can be extended
to address this case. We consider a model where data is
downloaded by the client, and discuss how our solution can
be extended to streaming content in Section VI.
We also assume that while publishers, clients and facilitators
may act maliciously and may collude, not more than a certain
fraction of facilitators are simultaneously malicious for each
content. Note that since the publisher chooses the facilitators,
the client colluding with one or more facilitators is a scenario
that is less likely, although we still handle that scenario. We
further assume that the auditor is non-malicious. We recognize
centralized facilitators offer services like piracy prevention,
advertisement and use of content delivery networks (CDN)
which we do not directly address in our work. That said, our
solution can easily be complemented by existing works like
Digital Rights Management (DRM) solutions to combat piracy
and advertisements on blockchain [23].
C. Problem Statement
The problem we address in this paper is to ensure fair,
reliable, privacy-preserving content delivery from a publisher
to a client in a decentralized manner. Let Π be a protocol
executed by a set of independent facilitators S, with each
facilitator Si ∈ S having a file share Fi and a client C
downloading a file F and paying price p.
Fair Exchange: Protocol Π is fair if the following hold:
1) Client Fairness: If C pays p according to Π, it is assured
of getting the file F after termination of Π.
2) Facilitator Fairness: For all i ∈ |S|, if Si inputs Fi
according to Π, it is assured of payment.
3) Publisher Fairness: If C pays p according to Π to purchase
a file F published by P , then P is assured of getting their
share of the payment.
4) Timeliness: Honest parties can terminate unilaterally and
malicious parties cannot make others wait arbitrarily.
Privacy: Protocol Π preserves privacy of the content if ex-
ecuting Π does not reveal the content to any facilitator. The
content should be revealed only to a client who has purchased
it by making payment p. A point to note here is that without
the privacy property, fairness guarantee is impossible as any
facilitator gains access to the content without payment, which
is not fair to the content publisher.
Censorship: An auditor can place restrictions as follows:
1) Disallow any purchase of content deemed illegal
2) Restrict who can purchase certain content
Audit trail: For all transactions, the system is required to have
a non-repudiable record of the buyer, publisher, content-id, and
time for review by an auditor.
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Fig. 1: System Architecture
III. SOLUTION
In this section, we describe our system architecture and
protocol and analyze the guarantees it provides.
A. System Architecture
In a content sharing marketplace with no central authority,
guaranteeing properties like fairness and privacy is a chal-
lenging problem. As two-party fair exchange is known to be
impossible without a trusted third party[24], there is a need
for mediation in trade. A decentralized blockchain network
of peers can replace the trusted intermediary, enforce fair
trading rules and also manage payment. It naturally delivers
transparency with its immutable replicated log of transactions.
However, storing the digital content directly on the
blockchain network would be impractical and not scalable.
Hence, we need a storage layer comprising of storage servers
along with the blockchain layer to complete the hosting of
the marketplace. Having only a decentralized storage layer for
mediation is not sufficient as these systems are meant to be
cooperative and trusted, i.e., the storage servers do not compete
with each other to store and serve files, and cannot guaran-
tee immutability and fair payment. This is different from a
blockchain setting where mutual distrust between the peers is
tolerated. These two layers can be operated independently by
different entities as long as each storage server can query some
peer in the blockchain layer. For ease of exposition, in the
sections that follow, a facilitator Si refers to a storage server
with access to a blockchain peer (possibly both operated by
the same facilitator).
Apart from this network of nodes, we have P and C
who only communicate with the facilitators. The publisher
P needs to know some subset of facilitators available in the
system along with access to a blockchain node for performing
transactions. The client C should have access to a blockchain
node for making queries and invokes to the ledger. An outline
of the system architecture is provided in Figure 1.
The storage layer, if supplied with unencrypted content,
would violate privacy. Also, a decentralized network may
be collectively honest, but any individual facilitator may be
malicious and cannot be trusted. Therefore, the publisher P
first erasure codes a file into chunks, encrypts each chunk,
and sends each encrypted chunk to a different facilitator in
the network, such that privacy is preserved and the system
guarantees fault tolerance. We explain the detailed protocol
and the algorithms in the sections that follow.
Our use of the blockchain network is quite generic and
most platforms with support for smart contracts should work.
However, a permissioned blockchain with stronger notions of
identity and support for access control, is better suited for
enforcing properties like censorship. A regulator or auditor
role with specific access rights to flag content as illegal or
invalid can be supported, enabling the smart contract to block
requests for censored content.
B. Notation and Preliminaries
We use ledger L to signify the blockchain layer hosting
the smart contracts. We additionally assume that all parties
register with L, and the public key of each party is available
with L before start of the protocol. We assume that each
party sends signed calls to L and that L internally verifies
signature before including each transaction. This ensures non-
repudiation because of the unforgeability assumption of the
secure signature scheme.
We associate a Uniform Resource Identifier(URI) with
every file F which unambiguously refers to that particular
file, derived from the file itself. Let GenerateURI(.) be the
procedure that returns a URI given a file. A sample URI can
be the hash value of the file, i.e., for a file F, URIF ← H(F ).
Erasure Coding is a process for encoding a data as n chunks,
such that any k out of n are sufficient to recover the data.
ErasureCode(F, k, n) is the procedure that takes as input file
F , and parameters k and n, and outputs the n data chunks.
Recover(F1, . . . , Fk) is the corresponding decode procedure
that takes k chunks as input and reconstructs file F . We refer
to this ratio k : n as the replication ratio. Reed-Solomon [25]
code is a popular optimal erasure code.
Let (Enc,Dec) be a secure convergent encryption scheme.
Convergent Encryption [26] is widely used in cloud storage,
in which the hash of the plaintext is used as the key to a
secure symmetric encryption scheme. This generates identical
ciphertext for same plaintext, which helps in de-duplication
and saves space.
C. Content Sharing Protocol
Figure 2 shows the entire protocol at a glance. Our protocol
is divided into two phases. The content upload phase deals
with a publisher distributing its content to the facilitators. The
content delivery phase is where the client fetches the content
from the facilitators and incentives are distributed.
1. Content Upload Phase: The Publisher P wants to mone-
tize F and needs to supply F to its chosen set of facilitators.
It generates URIF which is used to uniquely identify F . It
breaks F into multiple erasure coded chunks F1, . . . , Fn, such
that any k out of n chunks are enough to reconstruct F . P
generates a set of keys for convergent encryption, with which
it encrypts the file chunks Fi to obtain Ei. It generates a hash
list of these encrypted file chunks so that any potential buyer
can verify integrity of received data. Finally, it uploads the
file chunks, one chunk to each facilitator, and then records the
encryption key set, price, URI and the hash list to the ledger.
Algorithm 1 shows steps to enable such a functionality.
2. Content Delivery Phase: In this phase, C wants to purchase
a particular file referred by URIF . It discovers this file through
Fig. 2: Protocol Flow
Algorithm 1: Publisher (P)
1 func ContentUpload (F , p , k , n ) {
2 Generate a unique i d e n t i f i e r f o r the f i l e
URIF ← GenerateURI(F )
3 Use erasure coding to break the f i l e i n t o
chunks , F1, . . . , Fn ← ErasureCode(F, k, n)
4 Generate keys f o r convergent encrypt ion ,
keyMap← [Si : H(Fi)], 1 ≤ i ≤ n
5 Encrypt the f i l e chunks Fi us ing the keys ,
Ei ← EnckeyMap[Si](Fi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n
6 Create l i s t o f hashes o f encrypted chunks ,
hashList← [H(E1), . . . , H(En)]
7 Upload f i l e chunks to f a c i l i t a t o r s by
sending Ei to Si , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n
8 Record d e t a i l s on b lockcha in by c a l l i n g L .
AddContentByPub(URI, p, keyMap, hashList)
9 }
the content listing on the blockchain. First, it queries the ledger
to fetch the price p of the file and generates a unique request
identifier reqID. C then pays amount p to the ledger. The
ledger accepts this payment only if the requested content is
not censored by an auditor. Upon successful payment, it gets
the decryption key map and the list of hashes of the file chunks
from the ledger. It first approaches any k facilitators, fetches
Algorithm 2: Client/Buyer (C)
1 func ContentDe l ivery (URIF ) {
2 Get p r i c e p from L f o r URIF
3 Generate a r e q u e s t ID , reqID
4 Transfer amount p to L by c a l l i n g L . Payment
(URIF , reqID)
5 Get keyMap, hashList from L f o r URIF
6 / / Retrieve content by approaching k facilitators
7 f o r ( i =1 , j =1; j<=n && i<=k ; j ++){
8 Send r e q u e s t to Sj with (URIF , reqID)
9 I f r e c e i v e d Ec with H(Ec) = hashList[m] ,
f o r some 0 ≤ m < n , then Ei = Ec ,
ki = keyMap[Sj ] , i++
10 }
11 Fi ← Decki (Ei), 1 ≤ i ≤ k
12 Return F ← Recover(F1, . . . , Fk)
13 }
Algorithm 3: Facilitator (Sj)
1 func ContentUpload ( ) {
2 Rece ive (URIF , Fj) from P and s t o r e l o c a l l y
3 Get keyMap, hashList from L f o r URIF
4 flag = (H(Fj) == hashList[i] f o r some 1 ≤ i ≤ n )
AND (H(DeckeyMap[Sj ](Fj)) == keyMap[Sj ] )
5 I f flag == FALSE , c a l l L . Complaint (URIF )
6 }
7 func ContentDe l ivery ( ) {
8 Rece ive (URIF , reqID) from C .
9 / / Check if payment has been done by C
10 r = L . IsPaymentDone (URIF , reqID )
11 I f r = “yes” then send Fj corresponding to
URIF . E l s e t erminate .
12 }
file chunks and matches their hashes with the hash list. If some
facilitators do not respond or respond incorrectly, C approaches
additional facilitators until it gets k correct file chunks. Finally,
it uses the key map to decrypt the file chunks and then recovers
the original file. Algorithm 2 outlines the steps followed by C.
In both phases, the facilitator responds as outlined in
Algorithm 3. Sj on receiving a file chunk first verifies its
integrity using the key map submitted on the ledger by P .
That is, decrypting the received content using the hash of the
unencrypted file chunk as the key, and then taking its hash,
must reveal the same hash. If the check fails, Sj raises a
complaint. If more than n−k complaints are raised for a file,
the file is not made available for clients to download. This
ensures that a publisher cannot provide malicious content to
facilitators. A key step during content delivery is that each
honest facilitator checks whether payment has been made
on the blockchain before serving content to a client. If the
payment is not done, honest Sj should deny service.
Payment: In section II-C, we had defined fairness from a
client and a facilitators perspective. In our proposed design,
the client fetches parts of content from the facilitators after
payment. This interaction between a client and a facilitator
contains no intermediary or verifiable log. Hence, ascertaining
whether a facilitator has actually served content or not is hard
as a malicious facilitator would always claim to have served
to maximize revenue. Similarly, a malicious client would also
claim to have not received content, if she only has to pay the
ones whom she claims to have got service from. To counter
this, our protocol enforces the client to pay a fixed amount
before downloading content and the blockchain transfers the
payment equally to all the facilitators serving chunks of URI
irrespective of whether they serve a particular reqID. We
suppose every facilitator is paid po amount of money for every
reqID that is served. A suggested value of po is discussed in
the next subsection.
D. Incentivization of Facilitators
Our choice of payment to all facilitators can attract free-
riding behaviour as observed in P2P systems like Bittorrent[8].
A facilitator rating system where the clients can optionally give
reviews about facilitators can help curb free-riding. The idea
is to kick out facilitators who are repeat offenders and have
them serve a forced downtime. The client can mark facilitators
who she got data from and also the ones whom she asked for
service but was denied. If the rating is kept on blockchain and
a cumulative score over time is maintained on ledger, then
the smart contract can filter low performing facilitators when
listing facilitators information to new clients. While clients
may be malicious in providing a rating, since they always pay
a fixed amount for a content in our system, they cannot gain by
providing a malicious rating. Blockchain based rating system
is an active area of research [27] and choosing the best fit for
our needs is left as future work.
We need to show that our proposed protocol is practical,
i.e., every rational player in the system has no incentive to
cheat. In a model where facilitators fail to serve content chunks
requested of them, we show a pay-off function exists that
ensures that it is in every facilitator’s best interest to keep
the failure rate to a minimum. We also discuss the tradeoff
between the different parameters of the system and how they
affect the behaviour of players.
1) Failure Rate: We assume that there are n facilitators and
we need at least k out of n facilitators to respond to the client
for the file to be reconstructed. For each S, let f be the failure
rate. Also, C chooses a server uniformly at random. For ease
of exposition, we assume that for each storage server, there
is a dedicated blockchain peer it connects to. This one-to-one
mapping can easily be relaxed with minor changes.
For Si, let the pay-off be po and cost for serving a chunk
be 1k , as k chunks are needed to reconstruct a file. We
define advantage as the difference between the pay-off and
the cost, i.e., a facilitator’s effective profit. Then, for each S,
the expected advantage is
E[adv] = (1− f) · k
n
· (po − 1
k
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+(1− k
n
) · po︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
+
k
n
· f · po︸ ︷︷ ︸
3
where
1) Si gets chosen to serve and serves to get payment
2) Si does not get chosen and still receives the payment
3) Si gets chosen but fails, and still gets the payment
Ideal Case. Let us assume that f = 0 and po = 1n . Then
E[adv] = 0 for each Si. This shows that in presence of ideal
honest facilitators, each facilitator is correctly incentivized and
there is no loss, even though facilitators are paid whether they
serve or not.
Real Case. In presence of errors, each client will have to
contact more than k facilitators. By setting advantage as −fn ,
we can obtain a real-valued solution to po. It would then be
in the collective best interest of each S to keep the failure
rate f to a minimum. This shows that there exists a candidate
pay-off function that disincentivizes failure.
We note here that according to our pay-off function, as
facilitators increase in the system, each facilitator would
get a lesser cut. This would represent practical marketplace
dynamics where corporations decrease margins to succeed
when competition increases. Facilitators could compete in
identifying and hosting popular content similar to publishing
houses and distribution channels today.
2) Latency vs Bandwidth: A client C needs to fetch at least
k chunks from n facilitators. She may choose to aggressively
approach all n facilitators and start receiving chunks, until
she gets k correct chunks. In this approach, C achieves the
minimum download time, but bandwidth may be wasted. On
the other hand, C may contact k facilitators at a time and only
approach another facilitator if she fails to receive a valid chunk
from a facilitator. This approach saves bandwidth at the cost
of latency in case of failures.
3) Availability vs Free-Riding: In a design for a content
sharing platform, availability is of high importance. In our
design, choosing k can be tricky. If k = 1, i.e., each facilitator
has a replica of the file, then the availability is very high. On
the flip side, free-riding would be rampant on such a system
because as long as a single honest facilitator is present, all
facilitators would enjoy payment without even serving files.
On the other extreme, if k = n, then there cannot be any free-
riding but the availability of the system would plummet. Also,
low values of k would be faster for the clients as mentioned
earlier and guarantee higher availability. In the next section
we would argue how our protocol satisfies the design goals
and which values of k are safe for use.
E. Design Analysis
In this section we argue that our proposed design satisfies
the goals outlined in section II-C. Our presumed adversarial
model allows the adversary to control all the malicious parties
together. However, we note that P chooses the facilitators.
Hence, a collusion among the client C and facilitator Si is
unlikely. Also, C and P has no direct interaction in our
protocol and hence their collusion case reduces to individually
malicious cases.
Fair Exchange
1. Client Fairness: Our protocol Π ensures that an honest
client who has paid p to L should get access to F . In particular,
it should get access to k valid chunks and their decryption
keys. Under the assumption that the blockchain is tamper-
proof and it can tolerate upto b out of n malicious nodes, then
as long as k < (n−b), there are at least k honest facilitators in
the system. These honest facilitators would follow the protocol
and serve chunks to C. This would allow C to decrypt and
reconstruct the file, as guaranteed by erasure coding. The smart
contract execution is also assumed to be tamper-resistant and
hence malicious parties cannot affect the key release by L
upon successful payment. Thus, client fairness is guaranteed.
2. Facilitator Fairness: In our protocol Π, all facilitators Si
are paid commission according to the pay-off function po, ir-
respective of whether they have served. Under the assumption
that the smart contract execution is tamper-resistant, the pay-
off for all facilitators is ensured because it is controlled by
L, regardless of whether they served C. Thus, our protocol Π
guarantees facilitator fairness.
3. Publisher Fairness: For every valid transaction, the pay-
ment is made to L. As the smart contract pays directly to P , Π
guarantees publisher fairness, unless smart contract execution
is tampered with.
4. Timeliness: To show that our protocol ensures timeliness
property, we need to look at each of the parties and show that
they can terminate unilaterally and a malicious party cannot
hold up the execution of the protocol arbitrarily.
For P in ContentUpload() (Algorithm 1), the file pre-
processing (lines 2-6) is done locally. The file chunk upload
can be terminated without cooperation from the facilitators.
The ledger transaction in step 8 is a single commit in the
blockchain system, which takes finite time under the assump-
tion that the blockchain system reaches consensus.
For each facilitator Sj (Algorithm 3), in the Content Upload
phase, it can deny file chunk storage and exit the protocol.
Malicious servers may fraudulently record a complaint on
blockchain, stating that they did not receive a valid chunk from
the publisher. But, the number of such complaints is bounded
by b or the blockchain integrity assumption would be broken.
In the Content Delivery phase, malicious C cannot force Si to
wait as it only provides the URI and reqID. Si, whether it
serves or not, gets payment from L which ensures timeliness
as Si need not wait arbitrarily long to get the commission.
At any point in Π, k < (n− b) ensures that C can fetch the
file chunks without having to wait arbitrarily. The malicious
facilitators may not respond or may give broken responses, but
as long as C receives k chunks from k honest facilitators, the
malicious facilitators cannot affect the timeliness of Π, which
in turn ensures liveness of our system. Hence, Π guarantees
timeliness property.
Privacy: According to Π, no facilitator holds more than one
chunk. An adversary needs access to at least k chunks to obtain
file F . Under the assumption that k > b, the adversary will
not be able to reconstruct the file, even though it may control b
facilitators and can obtain the decryption keys from the ledger.
Hence, no facilitator can gain access to the whole file and
only a client who has paid will be allowed to download F .
Therefore, Π guarantees privacy.
Censorship: In our proposed protocol Π, L maintains a list
of censored content. Only Auditors have write access to this
list. When C queries GetPrice() or invokes Payment() for
a particular URI , L checks whether that URI is on the list.
It only executes the request if the content is not censored. As
long as the blockchain layer is tamper-resistant, payment will
not be made for a URI present on the censor list. Every honest
facilitator Si checks with L before serving content, and hence
as long as k > b, the adversary will not be able to access a
censored content. Hence, Π supports censorship.
As discussed above, the ideal bound for values of k is
b < k < (n − b), where the lower bound ensures privacy
& censorship and the upper bound ensures fairness. This
might sound like a tricky bound for PoW based systems like
Bitcoin [11] where b < n/2, but recent works [28] show that
the practical bound is much lower than that. Other consensus
like PoS and BFT already have bounds < n/2. For example,
PBFT [29] can tolerate < n/3 faulty nodes among n nodes.
Hence for PBFT, the bounds for k would be, n/3 < k < 2n/3.
Audit Trail: All the content upload, requests and payments
go through the smart contract, leaving an append-only trail of
transactions. Any auditor can just query the blocks and gain
full information on the trail of transactions.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
We present details of our prototype system components,
namely the blockchain layer and the storage layer, in Sec-
tion IV-A, and describe the interactions of the various entities
with these components in Section IV-B.
A. System Components
For our prototype, we chose Hyperledger Fabric [5] as the
blockchain layer and Tahoe-LAFS [6] as the storage layer,
as they provide the right building blocks for the features we
wanted to support. A facilitator may run a Tahoe server and/or
a Fabric peer with the smart contract described below.
1) Hyperledger Fabric: We required a permissioned
blockchain platform with support for smart contracts that
would scale well in terms of transaction throughput and
commit latency. Hyperledger Fabric [5] (referred to as just
Fabric henceforth) served our requirements well and is easy
to setup and use. It is an open source, modular, permissioned
blockchain platform maintained by the Linux Foundation that
permits pluggable components for consensus, data store and
membership service management among other modules.
At its core, Fabric allows for application sharding via
channels, which are independent blockchain systems. While
we currently model our system as a single channel, it’s easy
to see that having geographic, category or genre specific
marketplaces make sense. Smart contracts that are executed in
a replicated fashion are called “chaincodes” in Fabric parlance.
Each facilitator operates a Fabric peer in the system and
runs an instance of our marketplace chaincode. This chaincode
maintains the content listing (as key value pairs in the ledger)
and provides the interface to make and verify payments and
is implemented in less than 250 lines of Golang code.
Some subset of the facilitators, auditors, marketplace author-
ities or independent third parties could be contracted to run
the ordering service used to order the transactions occuring on
the blockchain. Individual ordering nodes need not be trusted,
especially when BFT ordering is being employed. Fabric also
provides access control capabilities which can be used to
implement auditors who can edit blacklists which would be
read-only to other users.
Listing 1 shows the data structures and ledger interface
represented in pseudocode.
Listing 1: Payments chaincode specification
struct Content:
string URI, // unique ContentID
string Name, decimal Price,
map [string]string keyMap, string[] hashList
struct Payment:
string URI, decimal Amount, string Link
service Payments:
// For publishing content
AddContentByPub (Content) return bool Success
// For facilitator to raise dispute over content
Complaint (URI) return bool Success
// For buyers to look for content
SearchContent (query params) return array Content
// For buyers to make payments for content
PayForContent (Payment, ReqID) return bool Success
// For facilitators to verify payments
IsPaymentDone (ReqID) return bool Done
2) Tahoe-LAFS: Tahoe-LAFS [6] (standing for Least Au-
thority File Store) is a cooperative distributed file system
platform that provides security and fault tolerance guarantees.
The erasure coded and encrypted file chunks are stored on a
set of nodes called Tahoe Servers each of which may crash
independently. As a whole, Tahoe provides a reliable data
store capable of tolerating such faults based on the parameters
of the file encoding (the replication ratio). Tahoe with some
modifications documented below makes up our storage layer.
B. Interaction Details
Publishers and buyers are implemented as scripts built over
the Tahoe client. Both these entities use the client to store files
onto the Tahoe servers in the form of chunks. Thus the Tahoe
client is aware of a set of Tahoe servers and contacts subsets as
needed. Additionally each client must be aware of at least one
Fabric peer for reading and writing to the blockchain ledger
and for calling the marketplace chaincode.
Publishers use the AddContentByPub interface to publish
files onto the Fabric network and then upload the actual
file chunks to the Tahoe servers. Facilitators can invoke
Compliant, if their integrity check fails. Buyers who wish
to purchase content lookup the listing maintained by the
smart contract through the SearchContent interface and make
payment using PayForContent. Depending on the replication
ratio configured, the Tahoe client contacts a subset of the
Tahoe servers to obtain chunks to construct the final file.
Each Tahoe server, before responding to a buyer uses the
IsPaymentDone interface on its associated Fabric peer to
verify that payment has been made. The changes introduced
by us into Tahoe-LAFS to support the above flow was less
than 100 lines of Python code.
All components were run as Docker containers orchestrated
using Docker Swarm for our experiments.
V. EVALUATION
The primary metric for any content delivery marketplace is
the latency experienced by a client for content download. We
measure latency as the time taken from the point the client
initiates a purchase to the point the client receives the entire
content. We measure the overhead in the delivery latency of
our solution compared to a baseline decentralized file storage,
to demonstrate that the solution is practical. Specifically,
we evaluate the overhead of our blockchain-based protocol
compared to using only the distributed file system operations
of Tahoe LAFS to deliver content. We study this by varying
several parameters including file size, replication ratio, load,
number of facilitators, inter-node latency, and the number of
simultaneous failed nodes in the system.
We evaluate our prototype on 7 VMs in a single data center
all running Linux (Ubuntu 16.04) configured with 16 vCPUs,
32 GB RAM and 100 GB HDD storage. Unless specified
otherwise, we use the following default values for our ex-
periments: file size of 10 MB, a replication ratio of 4:6, and 6
facilitators. In each experiment, we vary a different parameter
keeping other parameters constant, to understand its impact on
performance. In the default cases, each of the facilitators and
the client are run on distinct VMs. In experiments with more
participants, multiple clients and facilitators are co-located on
these VMs, in a load-balanced manner. Each experiment is run
5 times and the averaged observations are reported.
Varying file size: We first study the impact of content file sizes
on client latency. Figure 3a shows the latency impact for both
upload and download of files in the presence and absence of
blockchain, for file sizes ranging from 100 KB to 100MB. As
expected, the latency increases sub-linearly with file size. For
both upload and download, the overhead of using blockchain
is within 10% of the baseline.
Varying replication ratio: An important parameter in our
solution is the replication ratio of erasure coding. It represents
the level of decentralization, fault tolerance and availability.
We present results for n = 6 and k varying from 2 to 6
in Figure 3b. While upload times remain nearly the same,
download times (both with and without blockchain) increase
with increasing k, as more chunks have to be downloaded
to reconstruct the original file. This is in accordance to the
explanation in Section III-D2. For all replication ratios, the
overhead of using blockchain is nearly constant for both
upload as well as download. Additionally, we performed
experiments where n was varied keeping k fixed (not shown
due to space constraints). The upload time increased with
increasing n as more chunks needed to be uploaded, but the
download times were nearly constant.
Varying number of facilitators: We next show that our
system scales horizontally by increasing the number of fa-
cilitators and evenly distributing the load among them. As the
replication ratio is fixed, a constant number of file servers
need to serve the file chunks, but the blockchain bookkeeping
increases with the number of peers. Figure 3c shows that
there is no impact on latency for variation in the number
of facilitators from 6 to 24 in steps of 6. This shows that
our system scales well with number blockchain peers, when a
fixed replication ratio.
Varying load: Next, we study how latency observed by a
client varies with overall system load, the results of which
are presented in Figure 4. Here, the x-axis shows the num-
ber of clients operating simultaneously, for both upload and
download scenarios (when we measure latency for uploads
there are no concurrent downloads, and vice versa). Each
client is attempting to download a different file and no
caching mechanisms come into play. For both with and without
blockchain, while the latencies increase sub-linearly initially,
the slope increases sharply for larger number of concurrent
users. We were reaching the resource limits on available
CPU and network resources (not shown) even for the case
without blockchain, suggesting that the bottleneck was in the
Tahoe server throughputs and not in our blockchain-based fair
protocol. Note that while these servers reached capacity, the
system as a whole can scale very well both horizontally and
vertically (by increasing individual server capacity).
Impact of inter-node latency: To emulate facilitators being
geographically distributed, we vary the inter-node latency, i.e.,
the communication latency between the facilitators. Figure 5
shows the impact of inter-node latency on overall system
latency for values of 20, 50, 100 and 200ms, which are
representative of the order of latency values experienced on
the Internet. For all latencies, the overhead of blockchain is
minimal (for 10MB files, 5% at 20ms to 10% at 200ms) com-
pared to the overall times. The baseline timings do increase
with increase in inter-node latency, but this is dependent on
the file store component and is something that all platforms
necessarily face.
Impact of faulty storage servers: Figure 6 (a) and (b) show
the system performance in the presence of 1 and 2 faults
respectively for increasing load in the system. In this context,
a fault means a malicious Tahoe file server that has the content
but does not deliver it upon client request. In the baseline case
without blockchain, with increasing load and faults the latency
increases. At lower loads, the difference between (a) and (b)
is not significant, but the presence of faults becomes more
prominent at higher loads where the overhead for 2 faults is
nearly double that of the overhead when there is only one fault.
The same pattern is seen with the presence of blockchain, that
is the overheads are similar and the presence of blockchain has
not changed the overheads. As such the performance of the
blockchain-based solution is not affected by the malicious file
servers. We do not discuss here the ability of the blockchain
itself to deal with faults as this is well studied in literature.
Overall, our experiments demonstrate that our decentralized
and fair marketplace for content delivery scales well with low
overhead and can tolerate failures to the extent supported by
the replication ratio.
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we assumed a generic model wherein publish-
ers determine facilitators to host their content. The payment
for the facilitators could be either a fixed periodic payment
or a payment for each purchase or a combination of the two.
Alternative designs are also possible that alter the role of the
facilitators and their interactions with the publisher and buyer.
For example, facilitators could own different stakes on the
content that is recorded on the blockchain. In this case, instead
of the payment being a fixed fee per purchase, the facilitators
could be compensated in proportion to their stakes. In each
variant, the facilitators could in addition choose to monetize
based on advertisements shown to prospective buyers. They
may or may not share a fraction of advertisement revenues
with publishers whose content has been popular. Facilitators
may also support personalized services for the buyer and rec-
ommend other content. While we refer to facilitators as simple
intermediaries in delivery of content, they may grow to play a
larger role in this ecosystem, akin to the centralized platforms
today but with stronger notions of fairness. In general, a wide
variety of designs are possible and our proposed solution can
easily be adapted to handle them.
While our exposition assumed that the clients would con-
tact only k honest facilitators hosting chunks of a content,
alternatives are possible. A client may contact some number
of facilitators between k and n as a means of trading off
bandwidth consumed and time taken to reconstruct the content.
In a geographically distributed system, a client may choose
the facilitators to download from based on proximity and
bandwidth to different facilitators. Facilitators could them-
selves employ content delivery networks (CDNs) to serve
clients from replicas located closer to them. Further, some star-
tups [30], [31] are exploring building decentralized CDNs. In
a future world, the facilitators in our decentralized marketplace
could support a decentralized CDN, wherein a client finds
content to purchase from one server. That server then employs
other servers in the CDN to actually deliver the content to the
client, rather than the client directly contacting servers.
Major video hosting platforms today offer streaming con-
tent rather than downloadable content. Although our model
(a) file size (b) replication ratio (c) number of facilitators
Fig. 3: Latency with varying parameters
Fig. 4: Latency with parallel load on system
Fig. 5: Client request latency with inter-peer latency
assumes the file is downloaded, it can be extended to handle
streaming. As streaming chunks are far smaller in size than
the chunk sizes we considered for erasure coding, we can
assume each facilitator to host multiple small chunks instead
of a single large chunk. To reduce the number of blockchain
queries, the facilitators can check payment for groups of
chunks at once, rather than for every chunk. Designing a model
to address all the demands of a streaming marketplace is part
of future work.
In this work, we only considered the payment scheme where
all facilitators hosting chunks of a content are compensated,
regardless of whether they actually serve a particular client.
In a sense, this compensates for the storage costs of a given
facilitator, with the transfer costs being borne by the facilita-
tors. Unfortunately, this could incite free-riding behaviour. We
adopted this model as when the client and/or the facilitator
could be malicious, it is inherently impossible to determine
which facilitators actually served content to a client. Further,
even an honest facilitator that sends its chunk to a client may
fail to reach the client due to network failures. A contrasting
approach of paying only the facilitators that actually serve
content to a client, while being difficult to implement in
practice, would compensate for the transfers (compensation
could also be based on a combination of periodic storage cost
and per purchase transfer cost).
A review scoring and reputation mechanism for the facili-
tators managed in a decentralized manner on the blockchain,
with pay-offs linked to review scores, could incentivize facili-
tators to both compete on attracting clients and also keep them
honest. We briefly discuss such an incentive scheme, but leave
a formal analysis to future work. Let us assume that there is
an ex post facto voting system in place where an honest client
C votes 1 for Si if it asks for a chunk and gets it correctly, 0
otherwise. Since the client cannot be unilaterally trusted, we
collect votes from servers as well, where Si votes 1 for C if
it successfully serves her, and 0 otherwise. A point to note
here is that the client must vote 1 for at least k servers. Let us
consider incentive strategies tied to such a voting mechanism,
and let us look at the strategies and payoff of each player.
Let us start with a scenario with just two facilitators and a
single client, where the client has to retrieve a single chunk
from any one of the facilitators. Without considering collusion
cases, the client has two choices - whether to select S1 or S2
and then, after downloading the file, either to vote honestly
or not. Her payoff is −p irrespective of her choice as the
payment is made to the ledger even before file transfer starts.
For a facilitator, its choices are whether to serve or not and
then whether to vote honestly or dishonestly. We consider the
following pay-off strategies:
(1) Pay a server only if both the client and the server vote 1: In
this case, the obvious strategy for the facilitator to maximize
its revenue is to always claim to have served.
(2) We can decide to penalize facilitators if there is a mismatch
in client and facilitator votes. But, a dishonest client can
misreport and wrongfully penalize a facilitator. As the client
has nothing to gain, we can talk about a probability q with
which the client is dishonest and analyze for which values of
q, the facilitator would be truthful.
But, this game is too simplified to capture reality. With n
(a) 1 faulty server (b) 2 faulty servers
Fig. 6: Latency with faulty nodes for downloads of file size 10MB
facilitators, the game tree quickly grows out of hand. Also,
if we consider the case where a client may collude with a
server, then the client payoff is no longer constant and the
strategies affect the payoff, making the game all the more
complicated. Solving this problem and showing the game to
be Dominant-Strategy Incentive-Compatible(DSIC) is part of
our future work.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a decentralized and fair mar-
ketplace for content sharing that supports a pay-per-purchase
model of compensating content producers. By leveraging an
innovative combination of blockchain, peer-to-peer storage
and erasure coding, our system guarantees fairness to all
participants despite presence of maliciousness or collusion,
privacy of content from peers involved in delivering content,
a configurable level of fault tolerance and availability, and
support for censorship of illegal content, all without reliance
on a central facilitator. We evaluate our system and show that
it can scale well with low overhead and discuss interesting
directions for future work.
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